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Abstract 
  This paper analyses the market for professional (expert) services where the experts 
are motivated by reputational concerns. A key feature of such markets, which is often 
overlooked, is that clients can have specific characteristics that affect their evaluation of the 
service, and (or) the likelihood the service can be provided successfully. These different 
characteristics can induce clients to choose between experts with different reputations. The 
paper shows that clients choices have an important impact on the incentives of experts to 
provide a high quality service. In particular, sorting of clients affects incentives through 
three channels: changes in the types of client who are indifferent between getting the service 
from experts of different reputation, changes in the information on good performance as a 
signal of an expert's talent, and changes in the average complexity of the service the expert 
provides which impacts on the marginal efficiency of effort. The paper also investigates 
under what conditions increased entry of experts increases their incentives to exert effort. 
The results of the model can be applied to examine the effects of entry into the markets for 
doctors, lawyers, professional consultancies. 
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.    1 Introduction and Motivation1
In markets for professional services such as healthcare, legal practice, professional consultancy,
experts (doctors, lawyers, etc.) with di⁄erent reputations compete in providing a service to clients:
patients can be treated by luminaries or young general practitioners; legal assistance can be provided
by a ￿Perry Mason￿as well as by unknown members of the Bar; intermediaries of di⁄erent standing
compete in the market for ￿nancial services. An importance aspect of such markets is that clients
can be widely heterogenous, too: patients can require sophisticated operations or more standard
treatments, defendants can go to court facing an involved murder accusation or a trivial quarrel with
neighbours, merging ￿rms can be of di⁄erent size, and a merger between two large multinationals is
typically much more complex than a merger between two small ￿rms. Heterogenous clients typically
derive a di⁄erent expected utility from hiring experts of di⁄erent reputation: a patient with a rare
illness might bene￿t from the expertise of a luminary more than a patient needing to ￿x a broken
arm; similarly, a ￿rm with a very promising project might value the services of a famed investment
bank in the going public process more than ￿rms with less promising investment plans. Thus,
heterogenous clients may ￿nd it optimal to sort into experts with di⁄erent reputation.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the e⁄ect of clients￿sorting on the incentives of experts,
motivated by reputational concerns, to provide their service at a high standard. Then, the paper
analyzes how increased entry of experts in the market modi￿es clients￿sorting and, in this way,
incentives of experts. The paper shows under what conditions increased entry boosts incentives
to exert e⁄ort and under what conditions increased entry depresses such incentives. The analysis
of the e⁄ects of sorting on reputational incentives help to shed new light on the debate about the
impact of increasing the entry of experts in a market on the average quality of the service provided.
This is a hot topic in the market for healthcare services as there is a debate about the extent to
which countries should constrain the supply of doctors by limiting the number of student who can
access medical colleges, or by tightly controlling the immigration of foreign doctors.
This paper builds a theoretical model to study the interaction between experts motivated by
career concerns and clients that can have speci￿c characteristics a⁄ecting their valuation for the
service, and (or) the likelihood the service can be provided successfully. In equilibrium, clients ￿nd
it optimal to sort into experts of di⁄erent reputation for being talented. Then, the model identi￿es
three channels through which sorting a⁄ects the incentives of experts to exert e⁄ort. The ￿rst is
based on the fact that the way clients sort into experts determines which type of client is indi⁄erent
1This paper is a revised version of chapter 3 of my PhD dissertation, completed at the London School of Economics.
My supervisor Antoine Faure - Grimaud provided great advice, suggestions and support. I also thank Heski Bar Isaac,
Rocco Macchiavello, Giuliana Palumbo, Andrea Prat, Giacomo Rodano, Lucy White, seminar participants at the RES
2008 and NASM 2008 conferences, and colleagues at LSE and Bank of Italy for helpful comments. All remaining
errors are my own. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily coincide with those of the Bank of Italy.
Corresponding address: enrico.sette@bancaditalia.it
5between getting the service from experts of di⁄erent reputation. The valuation these types have
for the service impacts on the premium clients pay in equilibrium to be served by more reputable
experts. This, in turn, a⁄ects the value to build a reputation and thus incentives to exert e⁄ort. I
dub this the ￿direct channel￿as it is directly linked to the clients￿valuation for the service. The
second channel stems from the fact that sorting of clients may in￿ uence the informativeness of a
success as a signal of talent. If the type of a client a⁄ects the di¢ culty of providing the service, an
expert who serves successfully clients who are on average ￿more di¢ cult￿ , will build a reputation
more quickly. This channel can be quite relevant in practice: the reputation of a lawyer winning
a complex trial, or of a doctor successfully performing a di¢ cult operation will get an especially
large boost. I dub this the ￿signalling channel￿ . The third channel is closely related to the previous
one: if the type of a client a⁄ects not only the learning process about the expert￿ s talent but also
the likelihood the expert provides the service successfully, then the way clients sort a⁄ects the
e⁄ectiveness of e⁄ort in rising the probability the expert succeeds, and thus the incentives to exert
e⁄ort. Succeeding in a complex operation can provide a strong boost to a doctor￿ s reputation, but a
more complex operation is more likely to fail: thus, the premium for being successful may increase,
but the likelihood of being successful may be reduced. I dub the latter the ￿complexity channel￿ .
The focus of this paper is on markets where reputational (career) concerns are the only incentives
motivating the behaviour of experts. This is a suitable modelling strategy for many markets for
professional services where the quality of the service provided cannot be easily veri￿ed by third
parties.
The paper develops as follows: section 2 reviews the literature, section 3 contains the description
of the model set up, section 4 derives the equilibrium and investigates the three di⁄erent channels
through which changes in the sorting of clients, induced by increased entry of experts, can a⁄ect
incentives to exert e⁄ort. Section 5 performs a welfare analysis, section 6 discusses results and
section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways: it investigates how sorting of clients
into experts a⁄ects the value of building a reputation and in this way the incentives for e⁄ort
exertion; it analyzes the e⁄ects of entry on incentives, by examining the impact of entry of experts
on clients￿sorting.
There is a large literature on career concerns and on expert advice. The former has been ￿rstly
modelled in the seminal paper of Holmstrom (1982) which spurred a large literature emphasizing
di⁄erent aspects and applications. Another important paper which clari￿es the nature and the
6mechanics of reputation is Mailath and Samuelson (2001)2. They underline the notion of reputation
as an asset and show the importance of maintaining uncertainty on a player￿ s type in order for
reputation to play an incentivizing role.
Two recent papers investigated the interaction of sorting and reputational incentives. Almeida
- Costa and Vasconcelos (2008) investigate the dynamics of ￿rms￿reputation when ￿rms implement
joint projects. In this case, the reputation of the partner a⁄ects the updating process about a ￿rm￿ s
reputation conditional on the outcome of the project. Importantly, they show that ￿rms may prefer
to start a joint project with a low reputation than with a high reputation partner, as the equilibrium
matching in￿ uences the dynamics of reputation. Anderson and Smith (2009) develop a dynamic
matching model which the characteristics of agents (reputations) evolve depending on their chosen
match partner. They show conditions in which positive assortative matching does not occur despite
the assumption of productive complementarity. They also investigate the e⁄ect of the information
rents generated by certain matches on wage pro￿les. This paper shares the idea that the learning on
an agent￿ s type is a⁄ected by the type of the partner an agent is matched with. However, here the
focus is on the impact of sorting (matching) on the incentives of agents to exert e⁄ort. Moreover,
experts have relatively little control of their matching with clients as this depends upon equilibrium
fees.
Sorting of clients into experts has been analyzed by two interesting papers on investment bank-
ing. The ￿rst is Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). The authors derive a model showing how
reputational concerns a⁄ect investment banks￿standards for Initial Public O⁄erings (IPOs) valua-
tion. They also sketch the e⁄ects of sorting of clients, but this has not a direct impact on experts
incentives. The second is Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) who investigate the matching be-
tween issuers and underwriters of IPOs and Secondary Equity O⁄erings (SEOs). They show that
the equilibrium features positive sorting as better ￿rms hire more talented underwriters.
A few papers deal with career concerns and heterogenous principals. Casas-Arce (2009) is very
related as he analyzes a situation in which employers di⁄er both in their productivity and in the
visibility of the agents working for them. The latter in￿ uences the extent to which career concerns
provide incentives to exert e⁄ort and the possibility of agents to move into di⁄erent jobs. This
paper is di⁄erent in that the type of the client (the principal) can a⁄ect also the learning process
about the ability of the agent3, and can a⁄ect her valuation for the service, which impacts on
equilibrium sorting, and in this way, on incentives. Moreover, the setting and the focus are di⁄erent
as Casas-Arce does not investigate the e⁄ect of increased entry of agents (more competition) on
their incentives. Kovrijnykh (2007) and Martinez (2009) are also related as they both study the
2See also the review paper by Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008).
3Casas-Arce considers an extension of Holmstrom (1982) in which the type of the principal (her productivity) and
the e⁄ort of the agent are additive.
7a job assignment problem in a career concerns model. They consider di⁄erent types of jobs or
principals, but do not allow for heterogeneity in visibility.
Most of the work on reputational incentives for expert advice (or ￿rm behaviour) focus essentially
on one expert only and do not really deal with the e⁄ects of competition and entry. An important
exception is Horner (2002) who shows that competition among ￿rms acts as a strong disciplinary
device and allows to sustain an equilibrium with repeated play of high e⁄ort, even when reputational
concerns fade out due to learning about ￿rms￿type. Kranton (2003) and Bar-Isaac (2005) suggest
that competition can have harmful e⁄ects on reputational incentives.
There is a large literature investigating the role of competition in markets for expert advice
and credence goods4. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) provide a thorough survey of the literature
and of the most relevant issues. They underline the critical assumptions that sustain the di⁄erent
results proposed by the literature. Using their terminology, this paper does not impose either the
veri￿ability assumption (as I assume the type or quality of service is not veri￿able) or the liability
assumption (as I assume that clients cannot ￿ne experts for malpractice). However, I assume the
quality of the service is observed by the market, that experts are characterized by a di⁄erent ability
in providing a good service and that they live more than one period, so that reputational concerns
generate incentives for the provision of a good quality service (or for refraining from fraudulent
behaviour).
The analysis of this paper is also related to the literature on competition and incentives. A key
contribution in this area is Raith (2003) who showed that tougher competition raises incentives to
exert high e⁄ort. Raith derives his results in a context where ￿rms provide explicit incentives to
managers in order to induce them to exert e⁄ort in reducing production costs. The mechanism
at work here is di⁄erent: ￿rstly there are no explicit incentives to motivate experts to exert e⁄ort
to provide a high quality service and secondly tougher competition a⁄ects incentives through the
sorting behaviour of clients.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on the role of middlemen, in that it underlines
the importance of the distribution of clients for the incentives of the intermediary to report her
information fully and/or correctly. This literature showed that middlemen help reducing time to
￿nd a suitable partner for exchange in a search and matching framework (Rubinstein and Wolinsky,
1987), study the impact of adverse selection on the incentives to collect and reveal information
(Biglaiser 1993, Lizzeri 1999), and the role of competition in shaping such incentives (Faure-Grimaud
et al., 2008).
4Following the early work by Pitchik and Schotter (1987), a large literature developed. Wolinsky (1993), Emons
(1997), Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), Park (2005) and Fong (2006) are related contributions. None of these papers
investigates the role of clients￿characteristics in shaping the incentives of experts.
83 The model
The model is set to describe a market for expert services, such as the market for doctors, lawyers,
professional consultancies. The market for doctors is going to be used as the main running example
throughout the paper, but the set-up aims at modelling a market for professional services more
generally.
Players: the economy is populated by a continuum of experts and clients and has an overlapping
generation structure. Experts can be of di⁄erent type (talented / untalented), and both experts and
clients only know the probability that experts are talented conditional on the history of the game.
Experts do not know their type: they share the same information about their talent as the other
market participants5. Moreover, experts are of a di⁄erent vintage: experts live for two periods,
and in each period there are young and old experts. In every period t; there is measure Qt of new
entrants and measure Qt￿1 of old experts (new entrants of the previous period). Overall, in period
t there is measure Qt + Qt￿1 of experts. Therefore, in each period there are young experts (new
entrants) whose probability of being talented is given by the prior probability an expert is talented,
old experts who were successful in the previous period and old experts who were unsuccessful in the
previous period. The probability that old experts, either successful or unsuccessful, are talented is
given by the posterior probability they are talented conditional on the outcome of the service they
provided in the previous period. The probability of being talented represents an expert￿ s reputation.
When providing the service, experts can exert unobservable and costly e⁄ort which increases the
likelihood the service is of high quality.
Clients live one period only6 and there is measure M > Qt+Qt￿1 of them. As the total measure
of experts is smaller than the measure of clients, then some clients are rationed7. Depending on
their valuation for the service and the equilibrium fees, clients sort into experts, who provide the
service. I assume the service is indivisible8.
Technology: the service provided by experts can be of high or low quality9 depending upon
the talent and e⁄ort choice of the expert, and, in some cases, also upon the intrinsic type of the
client. Talented experts generate a high quality service with probability ￿ < 1, while untalented
5This point is further explained when discussing the information structure below. The same assumption is, among
others, in Holmstrom 1982.
6Alternatively, clients can live foreover, but their type changes. The main idea is that the characteristics of the
problem of a client, which are summarized in a client￿ s type, are not constant, but change period by period.
7In equilibrium, fees determine which clients are better o⁄ not purchasing the service. This is with little loss of
generality as results hold as long as there is excess demand for the most reputable experts because this is necessary
to provide some incentives to build a reputation.
8Experts cannot agree to provide ￿half￿service.
9In some applications, it can be said that the service can have a positive outcome (e.g. the successful treatment
of an illness) or a negative outcome. This would just be a relabeling. Thus, in the paper ￿high quality￿ , ￿positive
outcome￿and ￿successful provision￿are used interchangeably.
9experts need to exert e⁄ort e 2 [0;1]; in order to generate a high quality service with probability





@e = 1; @2c
@e2 > 0; so
that the cost of e⁄ort is strictly convex.
Players payo⁄: experts get a fee F for the service they o⁄er and sustain an unobservable cost
of e⁄ort c(e): The period payo⁄ for an expert is then given by Ft ￿ c(et): However, experts live
for more than one period and they also take into account the continuation payo⁄ when choosing
e⁄ort optimally. Therefore, the full payo⁄ for an expert is Ft ￿ c(et) + ￿EW(￿t+1) where ￿ ￿ 1 is
a discount factor and EW(￿) is the expected continuation payo⁄, function of future beliefs about
the expert￿ s talent. In order to ease notation, and without loss of generality, ￿ = 1:
Clients are characterized by a type ￿. This can represent either their valuation for the service,
or the ￿complexity￿of their case (or both). The latter can be, for example, the gravity of an illness,
the complexity of a judicial case, the quality of a ￿rm, etc. Three cases are analyzed:
1. The type ￿ is clients￿valuation for the service. In such a case denote as UH and UL the
payo⁄s in case of high (successful) and low (unsuccessful) quality (provision) of the service. UL(￿)
is normalized to zero and the subscript H is dropped11. The function U is assumed to be continuous
in ￿: The function p represents the probability the service provided is of high quality. In this case,
the type of the client does not a⁄ect the probability of high quality provision of the service and p is
linear in ￿ and e so that, p = ￿￿ +(1￿￿)￿e, and the expected utility of getting the service from an
expert of expected talent (reputation) ￿ exerting e⁄ort e is [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e]U(￿): In order to ease











so that higher types value the service more; the expected value of the service is increasing in
the expert￿ s talent, it is not decreasing in e⁄ort, and the inequality is strict when the expert is
untalented, otherwise, e⁄ort has no e⁄ect. When ￿ represents clients￿valuation for the service, the
e⁄ect of sorting operates only through the the direct channel.
2. The type ￿ represents the di¢ culty of the case which a⁄ects the likelihood of successful
provision of the service. Apart from this, all clients have the same valuation for a successful service,
UH which is normalized to 1, while UL is still normalized to zero. The probability of a successful
10This formulation borrows from Tadelis (2002) and it is useful as it ensures the existence of a unique equilibrium
e⁄ort level e for given beliefs about future period e⁄ort levels. This ensures comparative statics on the e⁄ect of entry
on e⁄ort are well de￿ned. However, results hold if it was assumed instead that e⁄ort is e⁄ective only for talented
experts, as long as the equilibrium e⁄ort level is unique. This formulation was used in a previous version of the paper.
11Notice that it is su¢ cient that at least the payo⁄ from receiving a high quality service depends upon ￿: The
normalization is with little loss of generality:
10provision of the service is now p(￿;e;￿) and it is modelled as follows
Pr(success j talented;￿) = ￿k
while Pr(success j not talented;￿) = ￿ez(￿)
where k 2 (0;1); z(￿) 2 (0;1) for all ￿; @k











￿ and z is continuous. In words, the
probability of providing the service successfully decreases as ￿ gets larger if the expert is untalented,
while it is constant if the expert is talented12. I also assume that k(￿) ￿ z(￿); so that the probability
of a success is always larger for a talented than for an untalented expert. Thus, the expected utility
of a client of type ￿ obtaining the service from a client with expected talent (reputation) ￿ is
V (￿;￿;e) = ￿￿k+(1￿￿)￿ez(￿): In this case the signalling and the complexity channels are at work
(but not the direct channel). If clients￿sorting changes, experts face clients with a di⁄erent ￿ and
the conditional probability of a success changes. This implies that the informativeness of a success
as a signal of talent is a⁄ected by sorting. In fact, a success on a more complex case is more likely
to come from a talented expert (for example, the successful treatment of a rare disease is a stronger
signal that the doctor is reputable). In this case, sorting a⁄ects incentives through the signalling
channel. However, as z(￿) changes, also does the total probability of a success: experts are more
likely to provide the service successfully if they face clients with lower types (simpler cases). Thus,
sorting a⁄ects incentives also through the complexity channel, together with the signalling channel.
3. The type ￿ represents both a client￿ s valuation for the service and the ￿di¢ culty￿of providing
the service at a high standard. This formulation aims at capturing the fact that more di¢ cult cases
can be harder to solve and that a high quality service can be more valuable for more di¢ cult cases.
This is a good modelling strategy for some markets. Among these, stands the market for doctors.
For example, a patient needing a complex liver operation may survive only if the surgeon performs
the operation successfully. The bene￿t for a high quality service of a patient that needs to ￿x
a broken arm is likely much lower. In such a case, there is a positive correlation between clients￿
valuation for the service, and the probability the service is provided successfully. Then, the expected
value for a client of type ￿ of the service provided by an expert of expected talent ￿; exerting e⁄ort
e is given by
p(￿;e;￿)UH(￿) = [￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ez(￿)]UH(￿) ￿ V (￿;￿;e)
where the notation is the same as above. This case combines the direct, the signalling and the
complexity channels.
In all the three cases, in any period t; clients obtain expected value V (￿t;￿;et) from the service
12This assumption is not strictly necessary for results but it is useful to simplify the analysis. As it will become
clear in section 4.2, it ensures that the premium for being successful does not depend on next period equilibrium e⁄ort
level.
11and pay the fee Ft. The latter is set competitively according to clients￿demand and experts￿supply.
If a client does not get the service she obtains an outside option normalized to zero. I assume that
experts cannot o⁄er screening contracts. This is not a very restrictive assumption in this setting
both because experts have only one instrument, the fee, to screen clients, and because there is a
continuum of experts with the same reputation, so that it may not be possible, in equilibrium, for
experts to provide rents to di⁄erent types of clients in order to induce them to reveal their type.
Information structure: The set of clients￿types is ￿ = [￿;￿] where 0 < ￿ < ￿ and clients are
distributed uniformly13 so that ￿ ￿ ￿ = M: I assume a client￿ s type is private information, while
the distribution of types is common knowledge14. Experts do not know the type of clients when
choosing e⁄ort, but hold correct beliefs about the average type they are providing the service to15.
Experts can be talented or not talented, and they do not know their type. Both experts and the
market share the same information about the probability the expert is talented. All players active
in a given period t know the current reputation of an expert which is denoted by ￿t; indicating
the probability, conditional on the information available at time t; that the expert is talented. The
outcome (for example, the quality) of the service is observed and the market is able to update beliefs
about expert￿ s type; however, the outcome is not veri￿able to court, preventing the possibility to
o⁄er experts contracts contingent on the quality of output16. To summarize, clients observe the
reputation level (probability of being talented) of each expert, the distribution of experts of each
reputation level, the fees and the outcome of the service.
Notice that the market does not observe exactly the type of each client, but knows, in equi-
librium, the distribution of types being attended by a given expert. Thus beliefs about experts￿
reputation are updated over the average type attended by experts of a given reputation. This helps
keeping the reputation levels of experts limited to three. If the type of each client was perfectly
observed ex-post together with the realization of output, there would be a continuum of reputation
levels for successful and unsuccessful experts, parameterized by ￿: Allowing for this possibility would
13This is with little loss of generality.
14The fact that clients know their need may seem in contrast with some of the proposed applications: often patients
visit doctors in order to discover what is their problem. However, the type ￿ may represent the physical status of the
person such as a strong pain in the chest or just a strong cold. In this case, patients would probably not be able to
fully understand the true ￿; but all result would hold also if patients (clients) had imperfect, but private, information
on ￿: This point is further discussed in section 6.
15Experts can learn the type of the clients after exerting e⁄ort. This does not change results as long as this
information is soft and cannot be credibly transmitted to the market. The assumption that experts do not know the
type of clients before exerting e⁄ort plays a role only when the type of the client a⁄ects the likelihood of a success,
or using the terminology of the paper, only when the complexity channel of sorting is at work. Even in that case, if
experts knew the type of clients before exerting e⁄ort, result would hold: each expert will exert e⁄ort as a function of
the type of client she faces. The e⁄ect of entry, in such a case, is on the aggregate e⁄ort level. See section 6 for more
on this point.
16If the outcome was veri￿able, it could be possible to o⁄er fees contingent on realized quality of the service. Then,
these explicit incentives would coexist with reputational incentives. The e⁄ect of entry on the latter, through sorting
would still be the same as outlined in this model, although equilibrium sorting may be di⁄erent.
12add little to the economic intuition, while rendering the model more cumbersome. This point is
further discussed in section 6.
Strategies and beliefs: clients compete for the services of experts of di⁄erent reputation.
Equilibrium fees are determined so as to balance the demand and the supply of services provided by
experts of each reputation level17. Given equilibrium fees, clients choose the experts from whom to
purchase the service and have no incentive to deviate. Experts choose optimally their e⁄ort level,
as a function of beliefs about their talent and the expected fees in the future period, denoted as
Ft+1: Formally, et : fFt+1;￿g ! [0;1]; when the type of the clients does not a⁄ect the probability of
success, and et : fFt+1;￿;E[(￿) j ￿(￿)]g ! [0;1] when it does (￿(￿) is the set of clients￿types getting
the service from experts with reputation ￿): Beliefs about experts￿talent are updated according to
Bayes rule. Notice that current period e⁄ort depends upon expected fees in the future period. In
general, these are a⁄ected by future period e⁄ort. Therefore, e⁄ort in period t is going to depend
on beliefs about e⁄ort in period t + 1 as these a⁄ect fees in period t + 1: This point is illustrated
and discussed at some length in the rest of the analysis.
Timing: each period a cohort of experts and clients drawn from the same respective distribution
replaces those who exit the market, so that the distributions of clients and experts are stationary.
Clients demand the service of experts and fees are determined. Then, clients choose the expert giving
them the highest expected payo⁄ (di⁄erence between expected value and fee charged). Clients get
served until there are idle experts. If some clients cannot be served, they get an outside option
normalized to zero. Then, experts exert e⁄ort and provide the service, whose outcome is observed
by the market which updates beliefs about experts￿reputation. Finally, clients exit the market and
the period ends. The fee can be paid up-front or after the service has been provided, this has no
e⁄ect on results.
4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Clients choose optimally which expert
to get the service from, and experts choose optimally their e⁄ort level. Beliefs are con￿rmed in
equilibrium, and updated according to Bayes Rule. I start assuming that the measure of new
entrants is constant across periods, so that Qt￿1 = Qt = Qt+1 = Q: Then, when focussing on the
e⁄ect of entry, comparative statics on Q are performed.
17The actual process through which fees are determined can take di⁄erent forms. In particular, clients may bid for
the service in an ascending auction. When the supply of experts of a given reputation is ￿lled, the fee is determined.
Alternatively, experts can post fees. However, experts are atomistic (there is a continuum of them), and they would
be competed away if they posted a price which is higher than that of competitors (with the same reputation). Results
are robust to di⁄erent choices and the paper does not explicitly model the fee formation process in order to streamline
the exposition. It just assumes that fees clear the market and players have no incentives to deviate.
13The ￿rst step is the analysis the behaviour of experts with di⁄erent ￿vintage￿ , then I will turn
to derive equilibrium fees and analyse the application policy and sorting behaviour of clients.
Lemma 1 Experts exert zero e⁄ort in their last period, while they may exert positive e⁄ort in their
￿rst period.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is common to all cases, and it is not new.
The novel part of the analysis lies in the strategic behaviour of clients and in its consequences. I
￿rstly study the simplest model, case 1, where the type of clients does not a⁄ect either the learning
process about experts￿talent, or the likelihood that a talented expert succeeds in providing a high
quality service. Then, I will focus on case 2, where the type of the client represents the complexity of
providing the service successfully. Finally, I will deal with case 3, where the type of the client both
represents her valuation for the service and the complexity of providing the service successfully.
Studying cases 1 and 2 separately is interesting in itself, but it is especially useful to gain the
intuition towards case 3, which combines them. Moreover, analyzing cases 1 and 2 in isolation helps
to underline that the signalling and the complexity channels can operate independently of the direct
channel.
4.1 Case 1 - Types as valuation for the service
The ￿rst step is deriving the preferences of clients over experts with di⁄erent reputation. This
allows to determine equilibrium fees and the set of types faced by experts of di⁄erent reputation in
equilibrium. The former depend upon the value clients attach to the service. Therefore they are
function the reputation of the expert, and, implicitly, of the expected e⁄ort exerted (e￿) and of the
expected type of client applying to experts of that reputation.
The reputation of experts following a success is given by:
Pr(Talented j Success;e￿) = ￿+
t+1 =
￿￿
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
t
as the probability of a success conditional on being talented is ￿; while the probability of a success
conditional on the expert being untalented and exerting e⁄ort e￿ is ￿e￿18: If the service provided
turns out to be poor, the reputation of the expert is lowered to
Pr(Talented j Failure;e￿) = ￿￿
t+1 =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿e￿
t)
18The e⁄ort level e
￿ is the market expectation of the e⁄ort exerted by the expert.
14In each period t + 1 there is measure Qt+1 of newly born experts with reputation ￿; measure
￿[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)et]Qt of old experts that were successful in their ￿rst period and thus have reputation
￿+
t+1; and measure [(1￿￿)￿+(1￿￿)(1￿￿et)]Qt of old experts who were unsuccessful in their ￿rst
period and thus have reputation ￿￿
t+1: For the moment, Q is assumed to be constant over time, so
that there is no change in the measure of new entrants and in each period there is measure 2Q of
experts (Q old experts and Q new entrants).
The expected value from the service, V (￿;￿;e￿); V (￿+;￿;0); V (￿￿;￿;0)19; is increasing in clients￿
types, thus higher types are willing to pay more for experts that are more likely to provide the service
at a high quality. The fact that experts do not exert e⁄ort in the last period has implications for
the preferences, and thus the sorting behaviour, of clients. It is obvious that all clients prefer old
successful to old unsuccessful experts, and new entrants to old unsuccessful experts, as the latter
both have a lower probability of being talented, and exert no e⁄ort. In fact, the assumptions of the
model imply that
V (￿+;￿;0) > V (￿￿;￿;0);8￿
V (￿;￿;e) > V (￿￿;￿;0);8￿
as ￿+ > ￿￿;￿ > ￿￿ and e ￿ 0: It is less obvious how do clients rate successful experts relative to
new entrants. Experts who are successful in the ￿rst period have a larger value for clients, as they
are more likely to be talented and thus to produce a high quality service. On the other hand, they
do not exert e⁄ort, while new entrants do, and therefore the latter might provide a service whose
expected value is larger than that o⁄ered by more reputable experts. In fact, it is not possible,
ex-ante, to tell whether
V (￿+;￿;0) > V (￿;￿;e) or V (￿+;￿;0) < V (￿;￿;e)
because the increase in value from applying to a more reputable expert can be more than compen-
sated by the decrease in value due to the lower e⁄ort level exerted by an expert with no career
concerns. Notice that this e⁄ect is always present, even in a model with in￿nitely lived experts, as
incentives to exert e⁄ort fade out as learning about an expert￿ s type becomes more precise.
As old experts do not exert e⁄ort, whether the highest valuation types prefer to get the service
from the most reputable experts (even if they do not exert e⁄ort), or from new entrants depends
upon whether ￿￿+ ? ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿: When ￿￿+ > ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿; old successful experts are
valued more than new entrants, even if the former do not exert e⁄ort. As talent is somehow valued
more than e⁄ort, I denote this situation as the talent intensive case. This condition depends upon
19Lemma 1 proved that old experts exerts no e⁄ort in equilibrium.
15clients￿beliefs about equilibrium e⁄ort. For this equilibrium to exist it is necessary that the true
equilibrium value of e⁄ort chosen by experts as a function of the application strategy of clients,
which depends upon beliefs, actually satisfy the condition. Rewriting the condition one gets, for
the talent intensive case
￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)e￿
t￿1
> ￿[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)e￿
t]
as the updating about current old successful experts is made on the basis of beliefs about their
previous period e⁄ort level, while the right hand side contains beliefs about current period e⁄ort
level by young (new entrant) experts in period t: In principle e￿
t￿1 can be di⁄erent from e￿
t: This
point will be discussed further in the proof of Proposition 2.
When, instead, ￿￿+ < ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿ new entrants are preferred to old successful experts, as
the fact that they exert e⁄ort in equilibrium compensates for the lower probability of being talented.
For this reason I denote this case as the e⁄ort intensive case. The paper deals with both cases20.
The talent intensive case is analyzed ￿rst. Then, attention will be placed on the e⁄ort intensive
case.
Case A - Talent intensive case: ￿￿+ > ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿; and ￿￿+
+1 > ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1 so
that all clients prefer to be served by old successful experts both in the current and in the next
period. The equilibrium fee for the services of experts of reputation ￿+; in any period t; must be
such that all experts are busy and therefore demand for the services of experts of that reputation
equals supply, and clients have no incentive to deviate. Those clients that are not served by the
most reputable experts, get served by new entrant experts with reputation ￿: Finally, part of the
remaining clients are served by the least reputable experts, and some clients get no service at all, as
M; the total measure of clients, is larger than 1; the total measure of experts. For ease of notation,
I drop the dependence on t; and instead denote current period variables without subscript, previous
period with subscript ￿1 and future period with subscript +121. The discussion above is formalized
in the following:
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, clients sort as follows: clients of type ￿ 2 [￿￿;￿] are served by
experts of reputation ￿+, clients of type ￿ 2 [￿￿￿;￿￿] are served by experts of reputation ￿; clients
of type ￿ 2 [￿￿￿￿;￿￿￿] are served by experts of reputation ￿￿: Finally clients of type ￿ 2 [￿;￿￿￿￿] do
20Notice that both conditions concern beliefs about equilibrium values of a choice variable. The following analysis
studies the conditions ensuring the existence of equilibrium in both the talent and the e⁄ort intensive cases.
21The incentives to exert e⁄ort of a young expert in period t; depend upon the fees she will get in period t + 1:
These depend, among other things, upon the beliefs about the e⁄ort level exerted by young agents in period t + 1:
The model has stationary equilibria, in which the e⁄ort level of young agents is constant in each period (as long as
no change in the measure of entrants occur). However, the model may also have non stationary equilibria in which
e⁄ort level of young agents oscillates from one period to the other. In the latter case, dropping the dependence on t
entails loss of information. However, for the purpose of this analysis, such loss is very limited. In fact, results on the
e⁄ect of entry hold taking any equilibrium, and the beliefs about the e⁄ort exerted in the next period that support
it, as given.
16not get the service. The thresholds separating the three subsets satisfy ￿￿￿￿ < ￿￿￿ < ￿￿ and are such
that supply equals demand for experts:
[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿1]Q = ￿ ￿ ￿￿
Q = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿e￿1)]Q = ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
M ￿ 1 = ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
equilibrium fees satisfy the following equalities
V (￿+;￿￿;0) ￿ F(￿+) = V (￿;￿￿;e￿) ￿ F(￿)
V (￿;￿￿￿;e￿) ￿ F(￿) = V (￿￿;￿￿￿;0) ￿ F(￿￿)
V (￿￿;￿￿￿￿;0) ￿ F(￿￿) = 0








+1 > ￿￿+1 + (1 ￿ ￿+1)￿e￿
+1
e￿ = e
If a talent intensive equilibrium exists, then the equilibrium e⁄ort level is unique, for given beliefs
e￿
+1; about next period e⁄ort level. The di⁄erence F+1(￿+
+1) ￿ F+1(￿￿
+1) is increasing in threshold
types.
Proof. See Appendix
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium.
Experts
Clients
￿+ ￿ ￿￿ 2Q
6 6 6 6 6 6
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
M
Figure 1
17This proposition shows that clients sort into experts, so that highest types purchase the service
from the most reputable experts, intermediate types purchase the service from experts with inter-
mediate reputation, lower types purchase the service from the experts with the lowest reputation,
and ￿nally very low types do not get served at all, as they value the service too little. Equilib-
rium fees ensure that demand equals supply for the services of experts of di⁄erent reputation and
clients have no incentive to deviate. For this equilibrium to exist, it must be that parameters are
such that the equilibrium level of e⁄ort actually satis￿es the conditions, ￿￿+ > ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
and ￿￿+
+1 > ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1; so that clients in equilibrium truly prefer to get the service from
old successful experts than from new entrants. Notice that current period e⁄ort level a⁄ects ￿+
+1:
Equilibrium e⁄ort level also depends upon beliefs about next period e⁄ort level e￿
+1; which is the
e⁄ort that is going to be exerted by new entrants next period. In principle, this can di⁄er from
the current e⁄ort level, just because in period +1 beliefs about period +2 e⁄ort level are further
di⁄erent. However, there can also exist an equilibrium where beliefs are ￿stationary￿ , meaning that
beliefs about e⁄ort are the same as long as the measure of experts and the other parameters of the
model are the same22.
A further result of the proposition is that the di⁄erence in fees charged by successful and un-
successful experts F(￿+) ￿ F(￿￿) is increasing in threshold types. This follows from the condi-
tions ensuring that clients sort. Thus, if there is sorting of clients in equilibrium, the di⁄erence
F(￿+) ￿ F(￿￿) increases in threshold types.
Case B: I now consider the case ￿+￿ < ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿ and ￿+
+1￿ < ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1: I label
this the ￿e⁄ort intensive￿case, as all clients prefer to be served by new entrants because these exert
e⁄ort and the probability of a success is larger than for old successful experts, even if the latter are
more likely to be talented. In such a case, there is little change in results. From the same reasoning
as in Proposition 2, it is possible to get
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, clients sort as follows: clients of type ￿ 2 [￿￿;￿] are served by experts
of reputation ￿ (new entrants), clients of type ￿ 2 [￿￿￿;￿￿] are served by experts of reputation ￿+;
clients of type ￿ 2 [￿￿￿￿;￿￿￿] are served by experts of reputation ￿￿: Finally clients of type ￿ 2 [￿;￿￿￿￿]
do not get served. The thresholds separating the three subsets satisfy ￿￿￿￿ < ￿￿￿ < ￿￿ and are such
22Assuming beliefs are stationary would simplify the analysis, with little loss of generality for results. This point is
further discussed in section 4.3.
18that supply equals demand for experts:
Q = ￿ ￿ ￿￿
[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿1]Q = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿e￿1)]Q = ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
M ￿ 1 = ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
where ￿￿￿￿ < ￿￿￿ < ￿￿: Equilibrium fees satisfy
V (￿;￿￿;e￿) ￿ F(￿) = V (￿+;￿￿;0) ￿ F(￿+)
V (￿+;￿￿￿;0) ￿ F(￿+) = V (￿￿;￿￿￿;0) ￿ F(￿￿)
V (￿￿;￿￿￿￿;0) ￿ F(￿￿) = 0

















+1) is increasing in threshold types ￿￿￿: If an e⁄ort intensive equi-
librium exists, then the equilibrium e⁄ort level is unique, for given beliefs e￿
+1 about next period
e⁄ort level.
Proof. See Appendix.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that equilibrium in both the talent and the e⁄ort intensive case
feature sorting of clients. Changes in sorting can have important impacts on incentives to exert
e⁄ort. In particular, entry of experts can modify the way clients sort in equilibrium and thus
impact on incentives to exert e⁄ort. However, before turning to the analysis of the e⁄ect of entry, it
is important to prove some results about the equilibrium, which are useful for comparative statics.
Lemma 4 The equilibrium function is continuous. The equilibrium is either a talent intensive
equilibrium, or an e⁄ort intensive equilibrium and equilibrium e⁄ort is unique.
Proof. See Appendix
These results ensures that at least one equilibrium exists, that such equilibrium is unique and
it is either a talent intensive, or an e⁄ort intensive equilibrium. This result is especially important
for the analysis of the e⁄ect of entry, as it allows to conduct comparative statics.
19I now assume that the measure Q of new entrants is not constant anymore. In particular, I
model entry as a permanent increase in the measure of young experts, and I also assume that entry
is not anticipated by agents in the previous period23. Increased entry of new experts raises the
supply of experts with intermediate reputation. Suppose, then, that after entry occurs in period 0
there is measure b Q of new entrants with reputation ￿; where and M > Q￿1+ b Q24: In period +1 the
total measure of experts is going to be 2 b Q . Then, the equilibrium thresholds for clients￿sorting
are modi￿ed and this impacts on the types who are indi⁄erent in equilibrium, and, in this way, on
the incentives to exert e⁄ort.
I ￿rstly analyze the talent intensive case. The e⁄ect of entry on incentives through its impact
on sorting is formalized in the following
Proposition 5 Entry modi￿es the sorting behaviour of clients both in the current and in the future
period. The change in the sorting of clients in the future period impacts on the premium that clients
are willing to pay to be served by the most reputable experts in a way that unambiguously reduces
the equilibrium e⁄ort.
Proof. See Appendix
This proposition shows that increased entry of experts reduces equilibrium e⁄ort. This follows
because increased entry in the current period raises both the measure of successful and of unsuc-
cessful experts in the future period. This reduces the threshold types indi⁄erent between being
served by experts of di⁄erent reputation, and thus lowers the premium for being a successful ex-
pert, which is increasing in threshold types. Thus, entry modi￿es the sorting behaviour of clients
and this impacts on the incentives of experts to exert e⁄ort.
Figures 2 and 3 show the e⁄ect of entry in the current and in the future period on threshold
types. Threshold types b ￿
￿
+1 and b ￿
￿￿
+1 have to be lower than the corresponding threshold types had








23This is only to facilitate the description of the e⁄ect of entry, as it means that e⁄ort level in period ￿1; i.e. in
the period before entry occurs, is not a⁄ected by entry. This assumption has no signi￿cant impact on any result.
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Entry also a⁄ects equilibrium fees both in the period when the increase in entry occurs, and in
future periods.
Proposition 6 Fees charged by new entrants and unsuccessful experts are reduced in the period
entry occurs, while the e⁄ect on the fees for the service of the most reputable experts is ambiguous.
On the contrary, all fees are reduced in future periods, when, moreover, the premium to be paid to
get the service from the most reputable experts must be lower.
Proof. See Appendix
This proposition shows that after entry occurs, fees charged by new entrants and by less reputable
experts are lower. This is due to the downward movement in the thresholds ￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿. On the
contrary, the e⁄ect on the fees paid to most reputable experts is ambiguous in the period entry
occurs. On the one hand, the decrease in the thresholds ￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ induces all fees to decrease.
On the other hand, the decrease in equilibrium e⁄ort raises the di⁄erence between the value of being
21served by the most reputable expert and the value of being served by a new entrant. However, fees
in the period after entry occurs are all lower.
I now analyze the e⁄ort intensive case. Assume now that an e⁄ort intensive equilibrium exists
before entry occurs (￿￿+
+1 < ￿￿+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1). Then, the e⁄ect of entry can be immediately
veri￿ed
Proposition 7 Entry reduces equilibrium e⁄ort.
Proof. See Appendix
The reasoning is the same as for the talent intensive case. Again entry changes equilibrium
sorting. This changes the types who are indi⁄erent between getting the service from new entrants
or from old successful experts and from old successful or from old unsuccessful experts. This in
turn impacts on equilibrium fees and thus on the premium for being successful, and in this way on
equilibrium e⁄ort.
The main di⁄erence with the ￿talent intensive￿case lies in the behaviour of equilibrium fees in
the period in which entry occurs. In fact, now all fees must be lower, both in period 0 and in period
+1. This follows as ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ Q > b ￿
￿
= ￿ ￿ b Q; so that ￿￿ > b ￿
￿
as Q > 1
2. Then, this necessarily
implies that b ￿
￿￿
< ￿￿￿ and b ￿
￿￿￿
< ￿￿￿￿: On the contrary, the behaviour of fees in the future period
is analogous to that in the talent intensive case.
4.2 Case 2 - Clients￿type represents the complexity of the service
This section analyzes the case in which the type of clients a⁄ects the probability of successful
provision of the service by experts, so that untalented experts are less likely to provide the service at
a high standard to certain types. This situation is likely to occur in practice. A surgeon performing
successfully a liver transplant with an innovative technique increases her reputation more than if
she repairs a knee joint (similarly, winning a class action suit against a large corporation is a strong
signal of talent for a lawyer as typically these are di¢ cult cases). As discussed in section 3 describing
the model, the exact type of the client (thus the exact di¢ culty of the operation, or of the legal
case) is not observed. The market infers the average type faced by experts of reputation ￿+;￿;￿￿;
as equilibrium sorting behaviour of types is known in equilibrium.
In order to isolate the e⁄ect of modelling type as the di¢ culty of providing the service success-
fully, clients are assumed to have the same valuation for the service. The probability of a success
of an expert facing clients of expected quality E(￿ j ￿(￿))25; is ￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿E(z(￿) j ￿(￿));
where E is the expectation operator: The impact of the complexity of the service on the probability
25The expectation is conditional on the set of clients applying to experts of reputation ￿:












; k(￿) ￿ z(￿)
in other words, providing the service to a higher type reduces the probability of success for an
untalented expert, while the probability a talented expert succeeds is constant, and does not decrease
as types are higher and cases become tougher26. The probability of a success when providing the
service to the lowest type is weakly higher for talented experts, so that the probability of a success
for a talented expert is greater than for an untalented expert for all type of clients ￿ > ￿:
Then, beliefs about the talent of the expert evolve as follows:
Pr(Talented j Success;￿;e￿) = ￿+
+1 =
￿￿k
￿￿k + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)e￿E[z(￿) j ￿(￿)]
as the probability of a success for an untalented expert depends upon ￿: If the service provided
turns out to be poor, the reputation of the expert is lowered to
Pr(Talented j Failure;￿;e￿) = ￿￿
+1 =
￿(1 ￿ ￿k)
￿(1 ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿e￿E[z(￿) j ￿(￿)])
and the measure of successful experts in period +1 is f[￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿E[z(￿) j ￿(￿)]gQ; while
the measure of unsuccessful experts is f￿(1 ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿e￿E[z(￿) j ￿(￿)])gQ:
It is important to notice that, if threshold types move upwards, E[z(￿) j ￿(￿)] is reduced as z(￿)
is decreasing in ￿: Then, providing the service successfully to a higher type raises the probability








[￿￿k + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)e￿E[z(￿) j ￿(￿)]]2 > 0
from the assumptions about k and z: However, providing the service to a higher type reduces the
probability an expert is talented following a failure, as untalented experts are less likely to succeed







@￿ e￿(1 ￿ ￿k)]
[￿(1 ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿e￿E[z(￿) j ￿(￿)]]2 < 0
26This assumption is not strictly necessary for results but it is useful to simplify the analysis. In fact, it ensures
that the value of a talented expert is always decreasing in the type of the client ￿ for all levels of e⁄ort. If k was
dependent on ￿; the total probability of a success would be ￿￿k(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ez(￿)): Its cross derivative with respect




@￿ ]: This can be either positive or negative, and it would be necessary to
impose conditions ensuring sorting, either positive or negative, occurs in equilibrium for result to hold.
23The total probability of success decreases if the client has a higher type. This has important
implications for equilibrium sorting. In fact, the valuation for the service provided by new entrants is
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The expected value of being served by a new entrant is decreasing in clients￿type. The following
proposition characterizes the equilibrium independently of whether preferences are talent intensive,
e⁄ort intensive or ￿mixed￿ .
Proposition 8 In equilibrium, clients with type ￿ ￿ ￿￿ get the service from new entrants. Clients
with types ￿ > ￿￿ randomize between getting the service from old successful, old unsuccessful, or no
24service. Equilibrium fees satisfy the equality
￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿z(￿￿) ￿ F(￿) = ￿+￿k ￿ F(￿+) = ￿￿￿k ￿ F(￿￿) = 0
and ￿￿ ￿ ￿ = Q.
Proof. See Appendix
This proposition shows that in equilibrium lower types get the service from new entrants (young
experts). A key point is that, given equilibrium fees, higher types derive a lower utility from being
served by new entrants than lower types, because the probability of success decreases with ￿: The
value of being served by old experts does not depend upon ￿ because it was assumed that k is
constant27. Thus, at the going equilibrium fees, higher types prefer old (successful or unsuccessful)
experts than new entrants.
It can be seen that if threshold type changes, incentives to exert e⁄ort change. In fact, as ￿￿







This represents the signalling channel. Moreover,
@E[z(￿)j￿￿￿￿]
@￿￿ < 0 as the average type faced by new
entrants increases when the threshold type ￿￿ is higher. Then, the probability of success must be
lower. This is the complexity channel.
Entry of experts modi￿es the equilibrium threshold ￿￿: This impacts on equilibrium e⁄ort.
Proposition 9 Entry induces con￿icting forces on equilibrium e⁄ort. Entry increases equilibrium
e⁄ort as long as the elasticity of the premium for being a successful experts (F+1(￿+
+1)￿F+1(￿￿
+1))
is larger than the elasticity of the expected probability of a success, both computed with respect to the
threshold type ￿￿:
This proposition shows that entry has an ambiguous e⁄ect on equilibrium e⁄ort. This follows
because the change in threshold types induced by increased entry of experts impacts both the
informativeness of a success as a signal of talent and the total probability of a success, thus the
marginal e¢ ciency of e⁄ort. These two e⁄ects always go in opposite directions, so that the total
e⁄ect on equilibrium e⁄ort is ambiguous. The proof shows that the net e⁄ect depends on the relative
size of the elasticity of the premium for being a successful expert, F+1(￿+
+1) ￿ F+1(￿￿
+1), and the
27If k depended on ￿; the equilibrium would feature negative sorting. Depending upon whether the equilibrium
is talent intensive or e⁄ort intensive, lower types would get the service from old successful experts or new entrants,
intermediate types from new entrants or old successful experts, higher types from old unsuccessful experts and very
high type will not get the service. This is due to the fact that all clients have the same valuation for the service, but
the probability they will be served successfully decreases with the type ￿: Thus, higher types have a low chance of
getting the service at a high standard, and thus have a lower willingness to pay than clients with a lower ￿: Results
for the model with k dependent on ￿ are available upon request. The next section will deal with the empirically more
interesting case where the type ￿ a⁄ects both the complexity of the case and the valuation of a successful provision
of the service.
25elasticity of the expected probability of a success, both computed with respect to the threshold
type ￿￿: These quantities may be observable in some markets. This point is further discussed in the
comment of Proposition 11.
Equilibrium fees are also a⁄ected by the increase in the entry of experts, due to the change in
the threshold type. However, in this case only fees for new entrants change in the period entry
occurs. In the following period all fees change, and they may either increase or decrease.
Proposition 10 Entry changes both current period fees for new entrants F(￿) and all future periods
fees F+1(￿+);F+1(￿);F+1(￿￿): Fees for new entrants may either increase or decrease. In the period
after the change in entry fees for old successful experts, F+1(￿+); are higher, fees for old unsuccessful
experts, F+1(￿￿) are lower.
Proof. See Appendix
This proposition shows that entry has an ambiguous e⁄ect on equilibrium fees charged by new
entrants, while it increases the premium for being successful as F+1(￿+) is higher and F+1(￿￿) lower.
The latter e⁄ect is due to the signalling channel: as threshold types are higher in equilibrium, both
a success and a failure are more informative about the type of the client. This in turn impacts on
clients￿willingness to pay for the service provided by old experts. The impact of entry on fees of
new entrants depends upon whether equilibrium e⁄ort raises after the increase in entry takes place.
When e⁄ort is higher, then fees may be higher, as there is a higher probability new entrants provide
the service successfully, and this raises clients￿valuation for the service of new entrants. On the
other hand, the higher threshold type reduces the probability of success, and this depresses clients￿
valuation for the service of new entrants.
4.3 Case 3 - Types represent both valuation and complexity of the service
This section combines the two previous cases. Now, a clients￿type represents both her valuation
for the service, and the complexity of providing the service successfully. This is an interesting case
for certain markets, but possibly not for others. In particular, the positive correlation between
valuation for a positive outcome and complexity of the case seems to be a suitable situation for
healthcare, for legal services, possibly for professional consultancy.
Results from the previous sections show that whether the expected value of being served by
an expert of a given reputation increases in ￿ or not, crucially shape the equilibrium sorting. For
the sake of conciseness, I focus on the case in which the expected value V (￿;￿;e) = f￿￿ + (1 ￿
￿)￿ez(￿)gU(￿) is increasing in ￿: When this occurs, the equilibrium sorting will resemble that of
section 4.1. This is the most interesting case, empirically, as we observe in practice that clients
with more di¢ cult cases tend to choose experts with relatively high reputation (old successful, or
26new entrants in the model). Notice, however, that results in the other case (negative sorting) are
quite similar, as it will become clear that the signalling and the complexity channels go in opposite
directions, and the e⁄ect of sorting on incentives is going to be ambiguous, even if the direct channel
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for all e;￿;￿; so that higher types are more willing to pay for the service. The fact that
@V (￿;￿;e)
@￿ is
monotonic ensures that there is sorting in equilibrium.
I ￿rst analyse the talent intensive case, which now requires that ￿+￿ > ￿￿ + (1 ￿￿)￿e￿E[z(￿) j
￿(￿)]: In this case, equilibrium sorting is the same as in case 1 (derived in Proposition 2). In
particular, types ￿￿￿ < ￿ < ￿￿ get the service from new entrants28, so that E[z(￿) j ￿] = E[z(￿) j
￿￿￿ < ￿ < ￿￿]:
The e⁄ect of sorting on incentives to exert e⁄ort can be understood investigating the derivative
of the ￿rst order conditions for optimal e⁄ort, ￿(1￿￿)E[z(￿) j ￿￿￿ < ￿ < ￿￿][F(￿+)￿F(￿￿)]￿
@c(e)
@e ;
with respect to the expected type buying the service from new entrants E(￿ j ￿￿￿ < ￿ < ￿￿): Changes
in either ￿￿ or ￿￿￿ (or both) induce changes in E(￿ j ￿￿￿ < ￿ < ￿￿). In order to be consistent with
the analysis of the e⁄ect of entry, performed in section 4.1, I assume that ￿￿￿; ￿￿
+1 and ￿￿￿
+1 decrease.
The change in the current period threshold type ￿￿￿ impacts on E[z(￿) j ￿￿￿ < ￿ < ￿￿]; and thus also
on ￿+
+1 and ￿￿
+1; while the change in next period threshold types ￿￿
+1 and ￿￿￿
+1; a⁄ects the valuation
for the service, both directly through the utility function of clients, and through the impact on
28A formal proof characterizing the equilibrium is omitted but it is available upon request. In general the proof is





@￿ U(￿) for all ￿; which ensures that clients sort in equilibrium.
27E+1[z(￿) j ￿￿￿
+1 < ￿ < ￿￿
+1]. Then, di⁄erentiating the ￿rst order condition for e⁄ort exertion yields:
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where @E+1(￿ j ￿￿￿
+1 < ￿ < ￿￿
+1) captures, with some abuse of notation, a change of both ￿￿
+1 and
￿￿￿
+1 in the same direction (i.e. either both increase or both decreased). The term
￿(1 ￿ ￿)




represents the e⁄ect of sorting on the marginal e¢ ciency of e⁄ort. As ￿￿￿ decreases, E[z(￿) j ￿￿￿ <
￿ < ￿￿] raises; as untalented experts are more likely to succeed on easier cases. Thus, e⁄ort is more
e⁄ective in rising the probability the expert succeeds. This is the complexity channel.
The term
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d￿￿￿ < 0 this term decreases if ￿￿￿ is lower. This follows
because facing easier cases makes Bayesian updating less precise, and this reduces the premium
for being successful as the probability the expert is talented conditional on a success is lower, and
the probability the expert is talented following a failure is higher, than before threshold type ￿￿￿
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represents the clients￿￿valuation￿ of the di⁄erent (higher) probability of a success. As E+1(￿ j
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28and this term goes up. This represents the larger willingness to pay of clients for the fact that the
probability of receiving the service successfully is higher. This raises the value of being served by
a new entrant, as only this class of experts exert e⁄ort, and it reduces the relative value of being
served by an old successful expert. For this reason it enters with a negative sign and reduces the
premium for being successful. This is a new part of the direct channel. Finally, the term
￿(1 ￿ ￿)f￿+
+1k￿ ￿ ￿k￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1E+1[z(￿) j ￿￿￿
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represents the direct channel: the same valuation e⁄ect due to higher types deriving a larger utility
from a successful outcome, as described in section 4.1. As both ￿￿
+1 and ￿￿￿
+1; decrease, the term is
negative.
This analysis illustrated the e⁄ect of sorting on incentives to exert e⁄ort29. In order to investigate
the full e⁄ect of changes in sorting on equilibrium e⁄ort it is necessary to perform comparative statics
on the equilibrium function. This is done in the following
Proposition 11 When the type of clients both represents their valuation for the service and a⁄ects
the informativeness of success and failure, entry induces con￿icting forces on the equilibrium e⁄ort.
The valuation for the service of threshold types is reduced, as threshold types are lower. The in-
formativeness of a success and of a failure as signals of talent is reduced, decreasing incentives to
exert e⁄ort. Finally, the total probability of a success increases, raising incentives to exert e⁄ort.
The net e⁄ect depends upon the relative size of the elasticity of the expected probability of success
(in absolute value) and that of the premium for being successful. When the former is larger entry
increases equilibrium e⁄ort.
Proof. See Appendix
This proposition shows that the sorting behaviour of clients a⁄ects equilibrium fees in three ways:
1) through the increase in the supply of expert services, which changes the types that are indi⁄erent
between getting the service from experts with di⁄erent reputation. Di⁄erent threshold types have
a di⁄erent valuation for the service and this a⁄ects equilibrium fees (direct channel); 2) through
the change in the informativeness of good performance as a signal of the talent of the expert: in
29Notice that the complexity and the signalling channels depend upon parameters in the current period. In partic-
ular, there is measure Q of old experts, and measure b Q if new entrants. Thus, threshold type ￿
￿￿ is going to be lower,
while threshold type ￿
￿ is una⁄ected. From period +1 onwards; there is going to be measure b Q of old experts and




+1 are a⁄ected. This implies that the complexity
and the signalling channels will not have the same impact on incentives in the current period as in period +1: This did
not happen in the basic version of the model, because the direct channel only operates through period +1 parameters.
In period +1 there are going to be measure b Q of new entrants and measure b Q of old experts.
29particular, if the average type being served by new entrants is lower, then learning about an expert
type occurs more slowly and less information is released after the market observes the outcome of the
service (signalling channel); 3) through the change in the probability of success, which modi￿es the
marginal e¢ ciency of e⁄ort: facing lower types leads more easily to a success (complexity channel).
When the latter happens to be particularly strong, entry can increase incentives to exert e⁄ort.
This occurs if the elasticity of the expected probability of success is larger than the elasticity of
the premium for being a successful expert with respect to threshold types. In principle, both these
quantities can be estimated, at least for some markets.
A notable example is the market for doctors. The elasticity of the expected probability of
success can be recovered by historical data on outcomes of treatments of di⁄erent operations from
very complex, such as liver transplants, to simpler ones. These data are typically available, and
actually doctors inform patients about the probability of success when discussing the opportunity of
performing a treatment or an operation. The elasticity of the premium paid to successful experts is
more complex to observe, although not impossible. As a ￿rst step, an econometrician can estimate
how the di⁄erence between the fees charged by more reputable and less reputable doctors changes
for patients with di⁄erent illnesses. To do this, it is necessary to get a measure of doctor￿ s reputation
and data on the fees charged by di⁄erent doctors for performing di⁄erent treatments. This amounts
to estimating the desired elasticity and it is relatively easy if such data are available. The more
di¢ cult step is to ascertain which cases are ￿threshold￿cases. This can be done by identifying which
patients (actually, patients with which illness) split about equally between more reputable doctors
and younger, new entrant doctors, and between new entrants and older less reputable doctors30.
These are the threshold cases. Then, one should compute the elasticity of the fees for more reputable
and less reputable doctors, with respect to the relevant threshold cases. Such information can guide
policy makers in deciding whether increasing entry of doctors is a desirable policy. In fact, by
comparing the values of the elasticities at the threshold cases, it would be possible to understand
whether entry increases or decreases treatment ￿quality￿ . A full analysis of the whole impact on
welfare of entry of experts (doctors) is contained in the next section.
Finally, it is also interesting to investigate how fees are a⁄ected by increased entry.
Proposition 12 Fees are lower in the period after entry occurs, both when entry leads to stronger
incentives to exert e⁄ort, and when entry weakens incentives to exert e⁄ort.
Proof. See Appendix
30The model says literally that one should observe that cases of similar gravity (￿ that are close) are treated
by doctors of di⁄erent reputation. Those are the threshold types. In practice, it will probably be observed that
each treatment, indipendent of gravity is performed by doctors of di⁄erent reputation. However, the proportion of
treatments performed by very reputable doctors will be very high for higher ￿; low for low ￿ and about the same as
that performed by younger doctors for threshold types.
30Even if incentives to exert e⁄ort are stronger, fees are lower. This follows because the signalling
and the direct channels impact the premium for being successful, while the complexity channel




The e⁄ort intensive case is essentially analogous. Entry modi￿es the sorting behaviour of clients,
and this a⁄ects incentives to exert e⁄ort through the same 3 channels identi￿ed above. For this
reason, a full treatment of the e⁄ort intensive case is omitted.
5 Welfare Analysis
The model shows that, in many instances, entry can reduce equilibrium e⁄ort and thus the average
￿quality￿ in the market. However, when the type of the client a⁄ects the likelihood of success,
increased entry may lead to an equilibrium where e⁄ort is higher. This occurs as long as the
elasticity of the probability of success is larger (in absolute value) than the elasticity of the premium
for reputable experts.
However, entry has a bene￿cial e⁄ect, even when it decreases equilibrium e⁄ort. This occurs
because when more experts are active in the market a larger fraction of clients get served. In fact
the increase in the supply of experts modi￿es threshold types, impacting on fees, and some clients
who preferred to get no service at the ongoing fees, decide to purchase the service. Therefore, entry
may generate a higher level of social welfare even if e⁄ort is reduced in equilibrium. This can be seen
by examining social welfare in the talent intensive case31. I consider social welfare in the second
period following the increase in entry, for two reasons: ￿rstly, this takes into account the full e⁄ect
of having a larger size of experts in the market, as there will be a larger measure of both young and
old experts; secondly, the increase in entry impacts on threshold types and equilibrium e⁄ort and
in this way on learning about expert￿ s talent (￿+ and ￿￿), but this a⁄ects clients from the period
after the increase in entry occurred. Thus, assuming increased entry occurred in period ￿2; social
welfare in period 0 is:
Z ￿
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31The e⁄ort intensive case is analogous.
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resent the e⁄ect on learning about old successful types. These can have opposite sign when entry
reduces equilibrium e⁄ort, as this raises ￿+ (lower e⁄ort means that a success is more likely to come
from talented experts), while entry also reduces threshold types and this raises the probability of suc-






















@Q ) which capture learning about old unsuccessful types. Then, the reduction in
threshold types changes the fraction of clients served by experts of di⁄erent reputation. This is cap-






@Q : The overall e⁄ect is
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the ￿rst two lines are positive as @￿￿
@Q and @￿￿￿
@Q are negative and ￿k￿+ > k￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z(￿￿)e in the
talent intensive case, and capture the fact that a fraction of clients who were getting the service
32from new entrants are now getting it from old successful experts, and a fraction of clients who were
getting the service from old unsuccessful experts are now getting it from new entrants. The last line




￿[k￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z(￿) @e
@Q]U(￿)d￿ captures the e⁄ect of increased entry on equilibrium
e⁄ort, and thus on the probability that clients served by new entrants obtain the service at a high
standard. This term has the same sign as @e
@Q: Thus, increased entry has an ambiguous e⁄ect on
social welfare32 as it may lead to lower equilibrium e⁄ort and to slower learning about experts￿
talent which could more than compensate the positive e⁄ect stemming from the increase in the
measure of clients getting the service.
This result provides support for policies that attempt to ensure that the supply of experts in
certain markets is somehow constrained. The market for doctors represents an important example.
Some countries limit the number of places for students in medical schools and put bounds on the
number of foreign doctors that can work in the country. Putting limits to the entry of doctors
may help to attain an optimal trade-o⁄ between increasing the access of the population to medical
services and keeping quality of the service high.
This analysis also suggests that a possible way to avoid the potential adverse e⁄ect of entry on
the incentives to exert e⁄ort is to introduce a test, or a certi￿cation system, for successful experts.
The certi￿cate, to be useful, must be correlated with talent. Then, if only the top end of the
distribution of experts got the certi￿cate, it would be possible to restore rents from getting a good
reputation. In fact, even if entry occurs, those who succeed have a chance to get into the top league
and the premium to be served by top league successful experts would be independent of entry.
Somehow, this kind of institutions seem to arise in practice: league tables for investment banks or
￿nancial analysts are published every year, and that could be a way to preserve the rents from
building a reputation even if competition is ￿erce33.
6 Discussion
This section reviews some of the most important aspects of the modelling strategy.
The intertemporal dimension is very important, as the incentives to exert e⁄ort depend on
beliefs about current period e⁄ort (which in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium re￿ ect correctly the
32In principle, it may be possible to identify the optimal size of new entrants, and in general of experts in the market.
This would solve the optimal trade o⁄ between the potential negative impact of a larger number of experts on e⁄ort
and the positive impact of a larger number of experts in terms of more clients obtaining the service. The solution to
this problem depends upon whether the welfare function is concave or convex in Q: This is di¢ cult to establish in a
general case, without making more speci￿c assumptions on utility functions, cost functions and parameters.
33Entry could still have some adverse e⁄ects as the premium for successful experts also depends upon the whole
structure of fees in the market, which may still decrease due to increased entry: However, ￿rationing￿the supply of
the most talented experts could help to boost the bene￿t from increasing entry in a market for expert services.
33equilibrium e⁄ort level chosen by experts), and on beliefs about future period e⁄ort levels, as the
two determine the equilibrium fees. In principle, beliefs about future period e⁄ort level could be
set rather freely, although they should be correct ex-post in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Then,
there could exist equilibria in which the equilibrium e⁄ort level oscillates between a high and a low
value, even if there is no change in entry, nor in other parameters. However, even in such a case,
entry modi￿es incentives to exert e⁄ort, and all results would hold with respect to the equilibrium
e⁄ort had entry not occurred. Thus, for example, e⁄ort could be larger after entry occurs, just
because it oscillates in equilibrium between a low and a large value, but it would have been larger
had entry not occurred.
The model assumes the exact type of clients is not observable, not even after the output of the
service is realized and observed. However, the market knows the average type of client being served
by experts of a given reputation level. This is not unreasonable in practice, as often evaluators
lack the skills to fully judge the complexity of the task performed by an expert, and the model
assumes evaluators infer an average degree of complexity. While this is ￿ne for some applications,
it may be less appealing in other cases. For example, the assumption would imply that the market
cannot observe the exact complexity of a case treated by a doctor, but knows that doctors with a
given reputation level treat cases of a certain degree of complexity. This is ￿ne for what concerns
evaluations performed by patients, but in other situations, in which experts are evaluated by their
peers, the true complexity of the task performed may be fully observed. Thus, it may seem that
this assumption limits the applicability of the model. However, this is not the case, as the same
results would hold assuming that the type of the client, and thus, for example, the complexity of the
operation, is perfectly observed after the outcome is realized. In such a case, old experts would have
each a di⁄erent reputation, depending on the exact ￿ they are matched with in their ￿rst period on
the market. Then, clients￿sorting would still have similar e⁄ects as those highlighted in the paper:
when choosing e⁄ort levels, in their ￿rst period on the market, young experts take an expectation
about the type they are going to face in that ￿rst period, exactly as in the model34. Thus, the true
role of the assumption is to streamline the model, rendering its presentation easier, as reputation
levels will be constrained to three: prior, posterior following a success, posterior following a failure.
Clients are assumed to know perfectly their type. Literally, this means that they know how much
they value the service and (or) how di¢ cult it is for the expert to provide the service successfully.
Moreover, at least until the expert has exerted e⁄ort, the client knows more about her type than
34If experts could observe the true type of clients before choosing e⁄ort in the current period, their choice of e⁄ort
would depend on the observed ￿: Thus, the e⁄ort level will be di⁄erent for each new entrant expert as a function of the
actual type ￿ the expert is matched with.In such a case, results would hold for the average e⁄ort exerted by experts
in the market. As, due to increased entry, new entrants face a di⁄erent pool of clients, the average e⁄ort chosen by
such experts will be di⁄erent, as predicted by the model. A version of the model allowing for the observability of ￿ by
the market, by the expert, or by both is available upon request and may be added as an extension of the base model.
34the expert does. In principle, this can limit the applicability of the model to some markets. For
example, patients typically do not know the treatment they need, and part of the service provided
by doctors is the discovery of the disease, i.e. of the type ￿; through a diagnosis. Still, the model
can be applicable to the market for health services if the type of the client is interpreted as follows:
the patient has a problem, which can be an headache, or a di¢ culty to breathe. This is a noisy, but
private, signal of the true disease ￿: Given how bad this problem is, the client decides whether a
more or a less reputable doctor is more likely to provide a successful treatment. The impact of the
problem on the patient￿ s welfare also represents her valuation for a successful solution: an headache
is more bearable than a di¢ culty to breathe. The doctor may learn something from the patient,
but does not know exactly the true disease ￿ when exerting e⁄ort: Then, e⁄ort in this context
can be interpreted as the provision of both a correct diagnosis and of a successful treatment. The
modelling of clients￿type may be enriched, but what is important for results to hold is that there is
some sorting in equilibrium. When this happens, the impact of sorting on reputational incentives
will operate through the three channels identi￿ed by this paper.
The model assumes that fees cannot be made contingent on the outcome of the service, so
that the only incentives are reputational. This is ￿ne for some applications, such as in the case of
doctors35, but it is probably less so for other applications. For example, in the United States, lawyers
can get fees contingent on whether they win the lawsuit. When fees can be made contingent on
observed outcomes, the model is not fully applicable, as experts are motivated both by reputational
concerns and by the explicit incentives provided by contingent fees. However, the e⁄ect of sorting
on reputational concerns would still be the same, although explicit incentives, in equilibrium, would
be set taking into account also the impact of sorting on reputational incentives.
Finally, experts charge a fee F for the service, and the service is not divisible, so that this rules out
the possibility that experts o⁄er screening contracts in order to attract di⁄erent types36. Moreover,
the fact that experts compete for types makes it di¢ cult to o⁄er screening contracts, as there may
not be enough rents to induce clients to separate (revealing their types) while providing experts
with adequate incentives to exert e⁄ort. This is a reasonable assumption for some applications, but
possibly less for others. In the case of doctors, treatments are typically not divisible and doctors
have few instruments to screen types.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates how the sorting behaviour of clients a⁄ects the incentives of experts moti-
vated by reputational concerns. The model shows that sorting can a⁄ect incentives in three ways:
35Doctors may be sued for malpractice, although they are often insured. Then, the ￿loss￿for doctors providing a
poor treatment to patients is often mostly reputational.
36Experts have only one instrument, the fee, to screen types.
35￿rstly through a change in the type of client who is indi⁄erent between getting the service from
experts of di⁄erent reputation (direct channel); secondly by a⁄ecting the informativeness of a suc-
cessful provision of the service by the expert: if successful provision of the service for certain types
of clients is more likely to be delivered by talented experts, then, the pool of clients applying to
an expert a⁄ects the updating of beliefs about an expert￿ s talent (signalling channel); ￿nally, if the
type of the client a⁄ects the likelihood an expert succeeds, facing ￿tougher￿types could reduce the
total probability of success (complexity channel), a⁄ecting the marginal e¢ ciency of e⁄ort.
The paper investigates the e⁄ect of entry in this framework. Entry a⁄ects the sorting behaviour
of clients in a way that reduces equilibrium e⁄ort through the direct channel. The signalling and
the complexity channels have instead con￿ icting e⁄ects on equilibrium e⁄ort. When the type of
clients a⁄ects both their valuation for the service, and the informativeness of a success as a signal
of experts￿talent, entry increases incentives as long as the elasticity of the probability of success is
larger (in absolute value) than the elasticity of the premium for successful experts. However, even
if entry reduces equilibrium e⁄ort, it can lead to higher welfare as more clients get access to the
service. The model also suggests that the use of league tables, or of other certi￿cation mechanisms
aimed at ￿constraining￿the supply of most reputable experts can be bene￿cial as they may help
preserving the rents from building a reputation.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The payo⁄ of any expert in the last period is given by Ft ￿ c(et); where
Ft cannot depend upon the e⁄ort level et, nor on realized performance, as both are not veri￿able.
Thus, current period e⁄ort et does not a⁄ect the revenues from providing the services, while it costs
c(et); therefore et = 0 is the unique optimal e⁄ort choice for old experts. The behaviour of experts
in their ￿rst (penultimate) period is more interesting, although the logic is still standard in models
38with career concerns. In case 1, in which the type of clients only a⁄ects the valuation for the service,
payo⁄ for experts in their ￿rst period is
Ft + [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿et]Ft+1(￿+
t+1)+
[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿et)]Ft+1(￿￿
t+1)
subject to the constraint that 0 ￿ e ￿ 1; and the ￿rst order condition for e⁄ort exertion is37
@c(et)
@et
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[Ft+1(￿+
t+1) ￿ Ft+1(￿￿
t+1)]
as now exerting e⁄ort in period t; raises the chances of obtaining in period t+1 the fee conditional
on being successful in the period t. Incentives to exert e⁄ort increase in the premium for being
served by an expert who has been successful in the ￿rst period (and thus improved her reputation).
In cases 2 and 3, the type of clients also a⁄ects the probability of success and payo⁄ for experts in
their ￿rst period is
Ft + [￿k￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿E(z(￿) j ￿(￿))et]Ft+1(￿+
t+1)+
[￿(1 ￿ k￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿E(z(￿) j ￿(￿))et)]Ft+1(￿￿
t+1)
where ￿(￿) is the set of clients￿types getting the service from experts with reputation ￿: The ￿rst
order condition for e⁄ort exertion is
@c(et)
@et
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿)E(z(￿) j ￿(￿))[Ft+1(￿+
t+1) ￿ Ft+1(￿￿
t+1)]
and again exerting e⁄ort in period t raises the chances of obtaining a higher payo⁄ in period t + 1:
Proof of Proposition 2. Under the assumption of case A, ￿￿+ > ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿; and experts
with reputation ￿+ are preferred by all clients so that there is excess demand for them. Then, fees
raise so that demand equals supply and there is no incentive to deviate. As higher types are more
willing to pay for the service, when fees go up they are still willing to pay for the services of most
reputable experts. As there are [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿1]Q experts with reputation ￿+ this represents
supply, while ￿ ￿￿￿ is demand. Fees must make the marginal client indi⁄erent between getting the
service from experts of reputation ￿+ and from experts of reputation ￿: Then, it can be seen that
all clients with ￿ > ￿￿ do not want to deviate. In fact, by getting the service from an expert with
reputation ￿+ clients￿payo⁄is V (￿+;￿;0)￿F(￿+) while by getting the service from an expert with
37Ignoring the constraint that 0 ￿ e ￿ 1: On the one hand, as
@c(1)
@e = +1 ensures that e = 1 cannot be a solution.
For the possaibility that e = 0; it will be shown that in equilibrium e⁄ort is striclty positive.
39reputation ￿ payo⁄ is V (￿;￿;e￿) ￿ F(￿): Then, it must be true that:
V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ F(￿+) > V (￿;￿;e￿) ￿ F(￿)
or
V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ V (￿;￿;e￿) > V (￿+;￿￿;0) ￿ V (￿;￿￿;e￿)
which is equal to
V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ V (￿+;￿￿;0) > V (￿;￿;e￿) ￿ V (￿;￿￿;e￿)
As V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ V (￿+;￿￿;0) = ￿￿+[U(￿) ￿ U(￿￿)] and V (￿;￿;e￿) ￿ V (￿;￿￿;e￿) = [￿￿ + (1 ￿
￿)￿e￿][U(￿) ￿ U(￿￿)] the inequality is veri￿ed as ￿ > ￿￿ and as in the talent intensive case ￿￿+ >
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿:
Similarly, clients of type ￿ > ￿￿ prefer to get the service from experts of reputation ￿+ than
from experts of reputation ￿￿: In fact, V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ F(￿+) > V (￿￿;￿) ￿ F(￿￿): This inequality
can be rewritten as
V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ V (￿￿;￿;0) > F(￿+) ￿ F(￿￿)
and by adding and subtracting ￿￿U(￿):
V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ V (￿￿;￿;0) = ￿(￿+ ￿ ￿￿)U(￿) = ￿(￿+ ￿ ￿)U(￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)U(￿)
so that:
F(￿+) ￿ F(￿￿) = V (￿+;￿￿;0) ￿ V (￿;￿￿;e￿) + V (￿;￿￿￿;e￿) ￿ V (￿￿;￿￿￿;0) =
￿(￿+ ￿ ￿)U(￿￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)U(￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿e￿[U(￿￿) ￿ U(￿￿￿)]
Then,
V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ V (￿￿;￿;0) = ￿(￿+ ￿ ￿)U(￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)U(￿) >
F(￿+) ￿ F(￿￿) = ￿(￿+ ￿ ￿)U(￿￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)U(￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿e￿[U(￿￿) ￿ U(￿￿￿)]
because ￿(￿+ ￿ ￿)U(￿) > ￿(￿+ ￿ ￿)U(￿￿) due to ￿ > ￿￿; ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)U(￿) > ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)U(￿￿￿) due
to ￿ > ￿￿￿; ￿￿￿e￿[U(￿￿) ￿ U(￿￿￿)] < 0 as ￿￿ > ￿￿￿: Therefore, types ￿ > ￿￿ have no incentive to
deviate and cannot do better than pay F(￿+) and being matched to an expert with type ￿+:
Clients with types ￿￿ > ￿ > ￿￿￿ prefer to be served by experts with reputation ￿+; but are
rationed by equilibrium fees, so they switch to experts of reputation ￿: By applying to an expert
40with higher reputation they would get V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ F(￿+): It can be seen that:
V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ F(￿+) < V (￿;￿;e￿) ￿ F(￿)
as
V (￿+;￿;0) ￿ V (￿;￿;e￿) < V (￿+;￿￿;0) ￿ V (￿;￿￿;e￿)
by the same reasoning as above and noting that now ￿ < ￿￿: In the same fashion it is possible to
show that also the other types of clients have no incentive to deviate. To complete the proof, it
can be shown that experts cannot do better. Experts are atomistic, if they tried to charge a higher
price, they would be competed away from other experts with the same reputation.
Finally, equilibrium e⁄ort is unique. E⁄ort depends upon expected next period premium for






+1;0) ￿ V (￿;￿￿
+1;e￿
+1) + V (￿;￿￿￿
+1;e￿
+1) ￿ V (￿￿
+1;￿￿￿
+1;0)
this expression can be rewritten as
￿(￿+
+1 ￿ ￿)U(￿￿






This depends both upon beliefs about the current period e⁄ort level e￿, which determines the value
of ￿+
+1 and ￿￿
+1; and upon beliefs about next period e⁄ort level, which will be exerted by new
entrants in the next period. The left hand side is decreasing in e￿: In fact, @￿+
@e￿ < 0; @￿￿
@e￿ > 0 but it
enters with a negative sign, and ￿￿
+1 and ￿￿￿
+1 are decreasing in e￿: Then the ￿rst order condition is
￿(1 ￿ ￿)f￿(￿+
+1 ￿ ￿)U(￿￿









the right hand side is increasing in e; while the left hand side is decreasing in e￿ = e in a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover,
@c(0)
@e = 0; while the left hand side is strictly positive when e = 0;
and the left hand side is equal to zero when e = 1; while the right hand side is positive (actually
it is +1). Both the left and the right hand side of equation 5 are continuous in e by continuity
of c; U; and of ￿+ and ￿￿: Thus, there is only one value of e that satis￿es equation 5 and the
equilibrium level of e⁄ort is thus unique, for a given level of expected next period e⁄ort e￿
+1: This
equilibrium exists as long as the equilibrium value of e satis￿es ￿￿+




￿+(1￿￿)e￿; after imposing the condition that beliefs are correct in equilibrium so that e￿ = e:
If one further assumes that beliefs about e⁄ort are stationary, meaning that if the market has the
same measure of experts and technology is still the same, beliefs about e⁄ort level across generations
41are constant, then e￿
+1 = e￿ = e; then equilibrium e⁄ort level is still unique (in fact, the left hand
side of equation 5 is still decreasing in e; the right hand side is increasing, the left hand side is
positive when e = 0 and negative when e = 1). Then, the condition ￿￿+
+1 > ￿￿+(1￿￿)￿e￿
+1 yields






+1) = ￿(￿+ ￿ ￿)U(￿￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)U(￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿e￿[U(￿￿) ￿ U(￿￿￿)] =
￿[(￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)e￿]U(￿￿) + ￿[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)e￿ ￿ ￿￿]U(￿￿￿)
from the conditions that ensure sorting in a talent intensive equilibrium, ￿+ > ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)e￿; and
in any equilibrium ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)e￿ > ￿￿; so that the di⁄erence F+1(￿+
+1) ￿ F+1(￿￿
+1) is increasing in
threshold types ￿￿, ￿￿￿:
Proof of Proposition 3. It follows the same reasoning used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium where e = e￿: In such an equilibrium,















￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿e)
The equilibrium function is
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿+
+1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1]U(￿￿
+1)+




















￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)e￿
+1
the function is continuous in e because U and c are continuous (notice that e￿
+1 is taken as a
parameter). Moreover, the function is decreasing in e: It is positive for e = 0 as proved in the proof
of Proposition 2 (notice that also ￿(1￿￿)(￿￿+
+1 ￿￿￿￿
+1)U(￿￿￿
+1) > 0; when e = 0), and negative for



















@e < 0 when e = 1):




+1; the equilibrium function in the talent and in
42the e⁄ort intensive case takes the same value,
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿+
+1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1]U(￿￿
+1)+













and the threshold ￿￿￿
+1 is the same both in the talent and in the e⁄ort intensive case (in the talent
intensive case, ￿ ￿ ￿￿
+1 = [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e]Q and ￿￿
+1 ￿ ￿￿￿
+1 = Qt+1; so that ￿￿￿
+1 = ￿ ￿ [￿￿ + (1 ￿
￿)￿e]Q ￿ Q+1; in the e⁄ort intensive case, ￿ ￿ ￿￿
+1 = Qt+1 and ￿￿
+1 ￿ ￿￿￿
+1 = [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e]Q;
so that ￿￿￿
+1 = ￿ ￿ Q+1 ￿ [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e]Q). Therefore the equilibrium function is continuous, is
decreasing in e, is positive for the lowest value of e and negative for the highest value. Thus, there
exists one value of e such that the equilibrium function is equal to zero. In other words, there exists
one equilibrium level of e⁄ort. This is unique by monotonicity and continuity of the equilibrium
function. Thus the equilibrium is going to be either a talent intensive equilibrium, if the equilibrium




+1 is negative; or an e⁄ort intensive equilibrium if the equilibrium




+1 is positive. This holds for given beliefs about next period e⁄ort
level e￿
+1: Assuming that beliefs are stationary, i.e., that e￿ = e￿
+1 so that, in a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium e = e￿ = e￿
+1; changes little. Also in this case, the equilibrium function is continuous,
the equilibrium is unique and it is either a talent or an e⁄ort intensive equilibrium. This can be
veri￿ed by setting e￿
+1 = e in the equilibrium function.
Proof of Proposition 5. I denote with a hat all variables after entry occurs. Therefore b ￿
￿
is the
threshold ￿￿ after entry occurred. I ￿rstly illustrate how the equilibrium changes in period 0; even
though this has no e⁄ect on the incentives to exert e⁄ort. In equilibrium, in period 0
[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿1]Q￿1 = ￿ ￿b ￿
￿








M ￿ 1 = b ￿
￿￿￿
￿ ￿
It can be seen that b ￿
￿
= ￿￿; so that there is no change after entry, in the current period. However,
this implies that b ￿
￿￿
is now lower. In fact b ￿
￿
is unchanged, while there is now measure b Q > Q




￿ b Q implies that b ￿
￿￿
is lower. This also implies that b ￿
￿￿￿
is reduced.
This, however, has no e⁄ect on the incentives to exert e⁄ort because the latter depend upon the
equilibrium fees for old experts in period +1: Entry in period t implies that there will be a di⁄erent
43measure of experts in period +1. Successful experts will be
[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b e] b Q
and unsuccessful experts
[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿b e)] b Q
and b e is equilibrium e⁄ort level in period 0; when entry occurs. The measure of successful and
unsuccessful experts depends both upon the measure of entrants, b Q ; and endogenously on the new
equilibrium e⁄ort level b e: The measure of entrants, successful and unsuccessful experts in period






+1 and the equilibrium fees in that period.
The latter are critical for e⁄ort exertion in the previous period. In period +1 thresholds are given
by
[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b e] b Q = ￿ ￿b ￿
￿
+1










M ￿ 1 = b ￿
￿￿￿
+1 ￿ ￿
The ￿rst order condition for e⁄ort exertion is
@c(et)
@et





+1) = [V (￿+
+1;￿￿





+1) ￿ V (￿￿
+1;￿￿￿














+1;0) ￿ V (￿+1;￿￿
+1;e￿
+1)] + [V (￿+1;￿￿￿
+1;e￿




+1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1]U(￿￿






+1 = ￿ ￿ [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b e￿] b Q and b ￿
￿￿
+1 = b ￿
￿
+1 ￿ b Q = ￿ ￿ [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b e￿] b Q ￿ b Q:
44In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, e = e￿. Thus, the equilibrium e⁄ort level satis￿es the
following equation:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿+
+1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1]U(￿￿










￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e
￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1]U(￿￿
+1(e;Q))+
[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1 ￿ ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)






where the notation underlines the fact that ￿￿
+1 and ￿￿￿
+1 are functions of e and Q: As long as the
condition for the existence of a talent intensive equilibrium, ￿￿+
+1 > ￿￿+1 +(1￿￿)￿e￿
+1 is satis￿ed,
the implicit function (7) is continuously di⁄erentiable from the results proved in Lemma 4 (it will
be shown below that if a talent intensive equilibrium exists before entry occurs, it is going to exist
also after entry occurs). Thus, applying the implicit function theorem to equation (7) yields the



































































de < 0. As
@2c(e)
@e2 > 0 by convexity of


















+1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1]U(￿￿




increases in ￿; due to the conditions on the sorting of clients, ￿￿+
+1 > ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿
+1
38. Then,
the result can be proved by showing that entry reduces threshold types. First of all, consider b ￿
￿
+1:




+1: The same applies to b ￿
￿￿
+1 as b ￿
￿￿
+1 = b ￿
￿
+1 ￿ Q = ￿ ￿ [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b e￿] b Q ￿ b Q . Thus,
the increase in the measure of entrants reduces threshold types. Then, this implies that de
dQ < 0;
so that equilibrium e⁄ort decreases as entry of new experts is larger. A last point to notice is
that the change in equilibrium e⁄ort exertion could in principle lead to a violation of the condition
￿￿+
+1 > ￿￿+1+(1￿￿)￿e￿
+1: However, ￿+ decreases in e￿: Therefore, if the initial equilibrium satis￿ed
the condition for the existence of a talent intensive equilibrium, then the condition is surely satis￿ed
after entry occurs, as after entry, equilibrium e⁄ort is lower.
If one further assumes that beliefs are stationary, e = e￿ = e￿
+1 (e⁄ort in period +1 depends
upon market conditions in period +2)39, all results are the same. as it can be veri￿ed by setting
e￿
+1 = e:









so that ￿￿ is constant, while ￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ are both reduced. Equilibrium fees are as follows
b F(￿￿) = V (￿￿;b ￿
￿￿￿
;0) < F(￿￿) = V (￿￿;￿￿￿￿;0)
in fact, V (￿￿;b ￿
￿￿￿
;0) is lower than before entry, as b ￿
￿￿￿
< ￿￿￿￿: Then,
b F(￿) = V (￿;b ￿
￿￿
;b e￿) ￿ V (￿￿;b ￿
￿￿
;0) + V (￿￿;b ￿
￿￿￿
;0) <
F(￿) = [V (￿;￿￿￿;e￿) ￿ V (￿￿;￿￿￿;0)] + V (￿￿;￿￿￿￿;0)
as b F(￿) is reduced because the di⁄erence V (￿;￿￿￿;b e￿) ￿ V (￿￿;￿￿￿;0) increases in ￿￿￿; but after
38Notice that, in principle, as beliefs about e
￿
+1 are set freely, it could be that the equilibrium in the second period
lies in the e⁄ort intensive case. In such a case, the premium for being successful is increasing in threshold types, too,
as shown in Proposition 7 below.
39Notice that in period +2; which is the relevant for the incentives to exert e⁄ort in period +1; parameters of the
problem (including the total measure of experts in the market which is 2 b Q) are the same as in period +1; which is






< ￿￿￿; and both b e￿ and V (￿￿;b ￿
￿￿￿
;0) are lower. Finally,
b F(￿+) = [V (￿+;b ￿
￿
;0) ￿ V (￿;b ￿
￿
;b e￿)] + [V (￿;b ￿
￿￿
;b e￿) ￿ V (￿￿;b ￿
￿￿
;0)] + V (￿￿;b ￿
￿￿￿
;0) 7
F(￿+) = [V (￿+;￿￿;0) ￿ V (￿;￿￿;e￿)] + [V (￿;￿￿￿;e￿) ￿ V (￿￿;￿￿￿;0)] + V (￿￿;￿￿￿￿;0)
as b F(￿+) moves in an ambiguous way. In fact, the terms [V (￿;b ￿
￿￿





are reduced, while [V (￿+;b ￿
￿
;0) ￿ V (￿;b ￿
￿
;b e)] raises as b ￿
￿
is unchanged, and b e￿ is lower, so that
V (￿;b ￿
￿
;b e) is lower. Fees in the future period will all be lower. This follows from the fact that the
premium for being successful, [V (￿+;b ￿
￿
+1;0) ￿ V (￿;b ￿
￿
+1;b e￿
+1)] + [V (￿;b ￿
￿￿
+1;b e￿
+1) ￿ V (￿￿;b ￿
￿￿
+1;0)]; is
lower in equilibrium as proved in proposition 5 (due to the lower threshold types for given equilib-
rium e⁄ort). If beliefs about e⁄ort are stationary, the premium for being successful is still lower,
despite lower equilibrium e⁄ort in period +1:
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is analogous to that of proposition 5. The premium for
successful experts is given by
F+1(￿+
+1) ￿ F+1(￿￿
+1) = V (￿+
+1;￿￿￿







Increased entry reduces threshold types, and as valuation is increasing in ￿; the premium for being
successful drops, exactly as in the talent intensive case analyzed in Proposition 5. Here, however, if
equilibrium e⁄ort decreases too much, the condition ensuring the existence of an equilibrium in the
e⁄ort intensive case could be violated. When this happens, the implicit function theorem cannot





However, in such a case, clients anticipate the new equilibrium e⁄ort and sort accordingly as in
the talent intensive case. As showed in Lemma 4, either a talent intensive, or an e⁄ort intensive
equilibrium exists. If entry reduces incentives so much that the equilibrium e⁄ort will be talent
intensive, then clearly equilibrium e⁄ort will be lower after entry occurs.
Proof of Proposition 8. As a ￿rst step, it will be shown that the proposed equilibrium can be
an equilibrium, indeed. The second step is proving that equilibria with di⁄erent sorting of clients
do not exist. The ￿rst point to notice is that the value of a new entrant is decreasing in clients￿
types. Thus, for types ￿ < ￿￿; ￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿z(￿) ￿ F(￿) > ￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿z(￿￿) ￿ F(￿) as
￿ < ￿￿ and z is decreasing in ￿: For the same reason, types ￿ > ￿￿ are worse o⁄ if they pay the
fee F(￿); as the expected value they get is lower. Then, all such clients with type ￿ > ￿￿ get the
service from the other available experts. However, the value of other experts is the same for all
clients, irrespective of type. Therefore, competition of clients raises fees to the point in which they
are indi⁄erent between getting the service from old successful, from old unsuccessful, or getting no
47service. Therefore, ￿+￿k ￿F(￿+) = ￿￿￿k ￿F(￿￿) = 0; as the outside option has been normalized
to zero. Then, no client has incentives to deviate and it can be proved that other equilibria are not
feasible. First of all, there cannot be full negative sorting (higher types getting the service from
old unsuccessful experts) as all clients are willing to pay the same for higher types and competition
among clients would drive fees up to the expected value of old successful experts. Lower types
can instead obtain rents by getting the service from new entrants. There cannot exist equilibria
where highest types get the service from old successful experts, lower types from new entrants and
intermediate types either get the service from old unsuccessful, or prefer the outside option. In such
a case, both higher and intermediate types have the same willingness to pay for the service of old
successful experts and competition raises fees to the expected value of obtaining the service from
old successful experts. Other equilibrium con￿gurations can be ruled out following the same logic.
This is true in any period t: Therefore, ￿rst order conditions for e⁄ort exertion in period 0 are:
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￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿k)





it can be seen that equilibrium e⁄ort is unique. In a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, e = e￿; then
substituting e￿ = e in eq. (8); for e = 0 the expression is strictly positive as ￿+ > ￿￿ and
@c(e)
@e je=0= 0: The di⁄erence ￿+ ￿￿￿ is strictly decreasing in e; and so is ￿
@c(e)
@e ; so the equilibrium
function is monotonic. It is also continuous by continuity of ￿+;￿￿ and c: Finally, when e = 1; the
function is negative, as
@c(e)
@e je=1= +1. Therefore, there exists a value of e which satis￿es the ￿rst
order condition, and such value is unique. Notice that next period e⁄ort does not show up in the
￿rst order condition, so that the analysis is much simpler as current period e⁄ort does not depend
upon beliefs about next period e⁄ort.
Proof of Proposition 9. First of all, the proof of Proposition 8 showed that the equilibrium
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as Q raises, so does ￿￿: Then,
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where the ￿rst term
@E[z(￿) j ￿ ￿ ￿￿]
@￿￿ (￿+ ￿ ￿￿)
is negative, as the probability of a success is lower when the threshold type moves up (this is the
complexity channel). The second term







is positive, as the signalling value of a success is higher when the threshold type is higher (this is
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Proof of Proposition 10. Proposition 8 showed that in equilibrium, ￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿z(￿￿) ￿
F(￿) = ￿+￿k ￿ F(￿+) = ￿￿￿k ￿ F(￿￿) = 0: Then, F(￿) = ￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e￿z(￿￿): As entry raises
the threshold type, b ￿￿ > ￿￿; this tends to decrease F(￿); as the probability of success, z(￿) is lower,
and thus the expected value of the service provided by new entrants. On the other hand, equilibrium
49e⁄ort may be higher, and this tends to increase equilibrium e⁄ort. The same reasoning holds for
F+1(￿): The increase in threshold type ￿￿ raises ￿+
+1 and lowers ￿￿
+1: This in turn is re￿ ected in a
higher F+1(￿+) and a lower F+1(￿￿):
Proof of Proposition 11. The proposition can be proved by investigating the sign of de
dQ; the
e⁄ect of a change in the measure of new entrants Q on e⁄ort. The equilibrium function is continuous
from the proof of lemma 4 and proposition 8 and from the fact that z is continuous and monotonic.






































Then, the proposition follows from the analysis of the change in the left hand side of the ￿rst
order condition for e⁄ort exertion as threshold types change, performed in the text. Term (1)
raises as ￿￿￿ decrease, while terms (2), (3), (4) decrease as ￿￿￿;￿￿
+1 and ￿￿￿
+1 drop. If term (1), the
complexity channel, dominates the other terms, the signalling and the direct channel, there can
exist an equilibrium where e⁄ort is higher after an increase in entry occurs; otherwise, equilibrium
e⁄ort is lower. This condition can be rewritten in terms of elasticities as follows
signf@
















































@￿ is taken over the vector of threshold ￿￿￿;￿￿
+1;￿￿￿
+1; thus this







@￿ > 0; and that threshold types are lower in equilibrium.
To complete the proof, conditions to ensure the existence of a talent intensive equilibrium must
be distinguished:
I) equilibrium e⁄ort can be higher after entry occurs. In the talent intensive case, this may
50in principle destroy the condition for the existence of a talent intensive equilibrium. Then, if
the new e⁄ort level is so large as to be above the thresholds ensuring the existence of a talent
intensive equilibrium, then an e⁄ort intensive equilibrium exists, in which case e⁄ort is larger: This
is analogous to the reasoning in the proof of proposition 7 (now the direction of the e⁄ect is di⁄erent,
though, as e⁄ort is increasing).
II) equilibrium equilibrium can be lower after entry occurs. In this case, if a talent intensive
equilibrium existed before entry occurred, it will surely exist now as e⁄ort is reduced after entry
occurs.
Proof of Proposition 12. Entry increases incentives to exert e⁄ort when the complexity channel
dominates the direct and signalling channels. Threshold types go down and this depresses F+1(￿￿
+1):
For the same reason F+1(￿+
+1) is lower. Incentives to exert e⁄ort may still be larger because by
exerting e⁄ort there are larger chances of obtaining a (smaller) premium for being successful because
sorting increases the likelihood of a success. When entry leads to weaker incentives to exert e⁄ort,
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